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THE DIFFERENTIAL POINT OF VIEW OF THE
INFINITESIMAL CALCULUS IN SPINOZA, LEIBNIZ
AND DELEUZE
SIMON DUFFY
In Hegel ou Spinoza,1 Pierre Macherey challenges the influence of Hegel’s
reading of Spinoza by stressing the degree to which Spinoza eludes the grasp
of the Hegelian dialectical progression of the history of philosophy. He argues
that Hegel provides a defensive misreading of Spinoza, and that he had to
“misread him” in order to maintain his subjective idealism. The suggestion
being that Spinoza’s philosophy represents, not a moment that can simply be
sublated and subsumed within the dialectical progression of the history of
philosophy, but rather an alternative point of view for the development of a
philosophy that overcomes Hegelian idealism. Gilles Deleuze also considers
Spinoza’s philosophy to resist the totalising effects of the dialectic. Indeed,
Deleuze demonstrates, by means of Spinoza, that a more complex philosophy
antedates Hegel’s, which cannot be supplanted by it. Spinoza therefore
becomes a significant figure in Deleuze’s project of tracing an alternative
lineage in the history of philosophy, which, by distancing itself from Hegelian
idealism, culminates in the construction of a philosophy of difference.
It is Spinoza’s role in this project that will be demonstrated in this paper by
differentiating Deleuze’s interpretation of the geometrical example of
Spinoza’s Letter XII (on the problem of the infinite) in Expressionism in
Philosophy, Spinoza,2 from that which Hegel presents in the Science of Logic.3
Both Hegel and Deleuze each position the geometrical example at different
stages in the early development of the differential calculus. By demonstrating
the relation between “the differential point of view of the infinitesimal
calculus” and the differential calculus of contemporary mathematics, Deleuze
effectively bypasses the methods of the differential calculus which Hegel uses
to support the development of the dialectical logic. 
Letter XII and “the Problem of the Infinite”
The relation of implication and involvement which ties the finite to the
infinite, “for an adequate knowledge” (Macherey, 163), is determined by
Spinoza in Letter XII where he develops “the problem of the infinite”:
Everyone has always found the problem of the Infinite very difficult, indeed insoluble. This is
because they have not distinguished between what is infinite as a consequence of its own
nature, or by the force of its definition, and what has no bounds, not indeed by the force of its
essence, but by the force of its cause. And also because they have not distinguished between
what is called infinite because it has no limits and that whose parts we cannot explain or equate
with any number, though we know its maximum and minimum. Finally, they have not
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distinguished between what we can only understand, but not imagine, and what we can also
imagine”.4
In order to illustrate the distinctions involved in the “problem of the infinite”,
Spinoza proposes for our reflection an example from geometry, to which
Hegel makes reference on many occasions:
… all the inequalities of the space between two circles, A and B, and all the variations which
the matter moving in it must undergo, exceed every number. That is not inferred from the
excessive size of the intervening space. For however small a portion of it we take, the
inequalities of this small portion will still exceed every number. Nor is it inferred because, as
happens in other cases, we do not know its maximum and minimum. For we know both in this
example of ours: AB is the maximum and CD is the minimum. Instead it is inferred simply
from the fact that the nature of the space between two non-concentric circles does not admit
anything of the kind”(Let. XII).
The example that Spinoza develops (Figure 1) consists of two nested non-
concentric circles, and the two extreme orthogonal distances between them,
AB and CD.
Figure 1
It allows Spinoza to present the relation between the finite and the infinite
as follows: that
some things are infinite by their nature and cannot in any way be conceived to be finite, that
others [are infinite] by the force of the cause in which they inhere, though when they are
conceived abstractly they can be divided into parts and regarded as finite, and that others,
finally, are called infinite, or if you prefer, indefinite, because they cannot be equated with any
number, though they can be conceived to be greater or lesser. For if things cannot be equated
with a number, it does not follow that they must be equal. This is manifest enough from the
example adduced (Let. XII).
In the case of the double figure of non-concentric circles, what Spinoza
suggests is that the variation of distances included between the external circle
and the internal circle, not able to be determined by any number, is infinite, “or
if you prefer, indefinite”, even though it is understood within certain limits,
that is, within the two circumferences and the greatest and least orthogonal
distance, which function as thresholds or limits, as in a maximum and a
minimum.
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Infinite Actu and the “Bad Infinite”.
When Hegel makes reference to this geometrical example in the Science of
Logic and the History of Philosophy he speaks only of the “space” interposed
between the two circumferences. In the History of Philosophy he glosses
Letter XII as follows: “The inequalities of the space [die ungleichen Abstände
des Raumes] between AB and CD exceed every number; and yet the space
which lies between is not so very great”.5 The attempt to determine all of the
spaces would be to constitute an infinite series, an infinity of unequal spaces.
Hegel, however, argues that “Spinoza rejects” such a mathematical conception
of the infinite “which represents it as an amount or as a series which is not
completed”, since, for Hegel, “the determination of magnitude contained in
[such an unlimited series] cannot at the same time be represented as a
quantum”.6 According to Hegel, any attempt to divide a continuous variation,
included between a minimum and a maximum, into parts in order to
reconstitute the variation by a number will result in a false infinite, since the
variation, which is continuous, can not be divided and extrapolated in this way,
that is, it can not be determined numerically. What is discovered is a
magnitude that does not equal any quantum or number, and which is
determined rather as exceeding all number, as expressed in statements by
Spinoza such as “and so on to infinity”.7 Hegel argues that this non-numerical
infinite is “there to hand, circumscribed, affirmative, actual and present in that
plane as a complete space between the two circles”. Hegel describes this
circumscribed infinite as “philosophic infinity, that which is infinite actu”
(LHP 262). Hegel designates the relation of substance to its affections by the
concept of the “actual infinite”, which is the realisation of the cause in its
effects, that is, the actual infinite is the realisation in the affections, or the
finite, of infinite substance. “It is an infinite which is not given in an unlimited
series [as the bad infinite], but [rather] all at once: it is this [actual] infinite
which is present in a limited reality, such as that included between a minimum
and a maximum” (Macherey, 171). The actual infinite “is not beyond, but
actually present and complete”, as bounded within this space.8
The affirmation by Spinoza of the existence of an actual infinite expresses
the implication and envelopment of the infinite in the finite. According to
Hegel, it would be a manifest contradiction to assign number to the actual
infinite since this is what distinguishes it from the bad infinite; the bad infinite
being the idea of the actual infinite from the point of view of the finite. The
idea of the bad infinite ignores the actual infinite, or “mistakes it with the idea
of an unlimited series which excludes the possibility of an actual infinite”
(Macherey, 171).
Hegel argues that Spinoza’s concept of the actual infinite “might have been
better expressed as ‘the negation of negation’” (LHP 262). The finite is primarily
negated by its opposite, the infinite, in the form of the bad infinite, since it is an
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infinite conceived from the point of view of the finite as an unlimited series. The
bad infinite remains defective since the only negation with which it is affected is
the primary negation of the finite. The bad infinite itself must then be negated,
in order for the finite to realise itself as actually infinite. The negation of the
bad infinite is therefore determinative of the actual infinite.
When Spinoza introduces the concept of the actual infinite in Letter XII
from the point of view of the seventeenth-century mathematician, contrary to
Hegel’s understanding, mathematicians are presented as being on the side of
philosophers. Spinoza argues that mathematicians “do not infer that … [things
which cannot be equated with any number] … exceed every number because
of the multiplicity of their parts”, as Hegel suggests mathematicians do.
Spinoza argues that mathematicians “infer” rather that “the nature of [such
things] cannot admit number without a manifest contradiction” (Let. XII).
With this statement Spinoza suggests that “no Infinite is explained in terms of
the multitude of its parts; and that, if every Infinite escapes number, it is not
because it contains too many parts, but because, by nature, it is not expressible
by it”.9 As a consequence, the introduction of a relation of contradiction as a
means of determining the concept of a non-numerical, or actual, infinite can
be avoided. Rather than acknowledging the consequences of this statement,
Hegel reads it solely as a statement about the distinction between two
infinities, the bad or mathematical infinite, and the actual or philosophic
infinite. According to Hegel, the mathematicians rely on a concept of number
in order to determine the concept of the infinite as the greatest of all numbers,
or the indefinite or unlimited. This admission of number in the determination
of the infinite enables Hegel to establish a vigorous contrast between the
mathematical infinite and the philosophic infinite. The concept of a non-
numerical, philosophic or actual infinite can only be conceived in a relation of
contradiction to a concept of the infinite that does admit number, namely the
bad or mathematical infinite. 
Hegel thus interprets Spinoza’s presentation of the mathematical infinite in
Letter XII as a bad infinite which is in a relation of contradiction with the
actual or philosophic infinite, an interpretation which is contrary to Spinoza’s
actual remarks. According to Hegel, the bad infinite functions only as the
immediate contrary of the finite, and is abrogated in the name of the finite
realised as actually infinite. “As soon as the cause has something else opposed
to it — the effect — finitude is present; but here this something else is at the
same time abrogated and it becomes once more the cause itself. The
affirmative is thus negation of negation” (LHP 262). The infinite, when
opposed to the finite, is conceived as the bad infinite, which is then sublated
and subsumed in the actual infinite, that is, the finite realises itself as actually
infinite. This is how Hegel resolves the relation of the infinite to the finite from
the point of view of his interpretation of Spinoza.
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This explanation by Hegel of “the problem of the infinite”, in relation to the
text of Spinoza, renders superfluous the particularities of the geometrical
example as exposed by Spinoza. Macherey argues that, as far as Hegel is
concerned, every finite mode “expresses an infinity, which it formally
envelops … as its cause” (Macherey 171) — for example, the space included
between the two circles, or, to take another example put forward by Hegel, the
infinity of points included in a segment of a line. This however ignores the
essential fact that the two circles are non-concentric.
Hegel does not distinguish between, on the one hand, the expression of the
circumference of circle A as a maximum and that of circle B as a minimum,
and, on the other hand, the expression of a maximum and a minimum as the
greatest and smallest distances between the circumference of circle A and
circle B. The “maximum and minimum” serve Hegel simply as a means for
defining the finite as a contained space or limited distance. Such an
interpretation does not account for the specificity of presenting non-concentric
circles in the example, since the same reasoning would hold if the distances
which separate the two circumferences were all equal. It is therefore evident
that “the two circles could not be concentric, for in this case there would be no
inequalities among the segments”.10 Macherey argues that “if Spinoza had only
wanted … to represent the idea of a finite quantum which entails nevertheless
an infinity of parts [which] exceeds all assignable number” (Macherey, 172),
he would not have had need of the precision that the two circles are non-
concentric. Hegel therefore neglects something that is essential to the
reasoning proposed by Spinoza. This simplification by Hegel renders
inevitable the reduction of the infinity between the circles to a simple
unlimited series represented by the idea of the bad infinite, which is
contradictory to the nature or essence of the finite thing, and which when
negated is abrogated in the expression of it as actually infinite.
The Problem of the “Bad Infinite”.
Macherey contends that, contrary to this Hegelian argument, things are not
so simple. The reestablishment of a clear separation between the infinite and
the finite is not sufficient to address what Macherey considers to be the
tendency of the imagination to represent the infinite in the finite as the ‘bad
infinite’, but merely begs the question of that tendency. Given that the relation
of opposition between the finite and the infinite imposed by the dialectical
logic springs from the negation of the infinite by the finite, Gueroult argues
that “far from causing their opposition to vanish by suppressing” the
expression of the infinite in favour of the expression of the finite, “the
imagination transforms it into an irremediable conflict, for the infinite,
wrongly understood” from the point of view of the imagination, “subsists no
less truly in things, and its negation”, again by the imagination, “amounts to
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nothing other than to confer upon it the properties of the finite. Thus, refusing
to submit itself to violation, [the infinite] … affirms its presence … by causing
to arise, from the depths of the alleged solutions dictated by the imagination,
the fundamental absurdity which is at their source”(210). The infinite refuses
to submit itself to, that is, it negates, the absurdity of the imaginary idea of the
infinite as the bad infinite, the alleged solution dictated by the imagination, or
the primary negation of the infinite by the finite. Therefore the establishment
of the actual infinite is dependent on the irremediable imaginary conflict.
Following on from this argument presented by Gueroult, Macherey
contends that Hegel’s argument “therefore repeats the point of view of the
imagination from which it seeks to distinguish itself” (172). What is neglected
by Hegel is “that essential character of the finite”, which, to return to the
distinctions of the problem of the infinite presented by Spinoza in Letter XII,
is “infinite by the force of its cause”, that which, Macherey contends, is
peculiar to all the modes, whether perceived to be infinite (unlimited) or finite
(limited). “The variation of distances included between the two non-concentric
circles is also infinite, not in itself since it is limited, but as an affection of
substance which expresses itself in it as the cause in its effect” (170), that is,
as the positive immanent expression of substance in its affections.
Macherey re-presents the distinctions of the “problem of the infinite” as
being between that which is infinite by its nature — the absolutely infinite, or
substance, and the infinite in kind, or the attributes — and that which is infinite
by the force of its cause — the affections of substance, or the modes. The
second term of this distinction is then carried over as the first term of the next
distinction: that which is infinite because it has no limits is distinguished from
that which is infinite, because it is not determinable numerically, that which is
unlimited or indefinite, even though included between a maximum and a
minimum. For Macherey, these two distinctions also characterise that between
reason (which is the adequate understanding of things) and the imagination
(which involves the inadequate representation of things). Substance, or the
absolutely infinite, can only be understood adequately and not imagined, and
its affections, which are infinite by the force of their cause, can be understood
adequately as infinite from the point of view of reason but only inadequately
as unlimited or indefinite from the point of view of the imagination. 
Macherey argues that “the traditional paradoxes of the infinite come from
these distinctions not being respected”. It is only necessary to re-establish
these distinctions in order that “all the contradictions are not resolved, but
effaced” (Macherey, 170). “For then”, Spinoza argues,
they would have understood clearly what kind of Infinite cannot be divided into any parts, or
cannot have any parts, and what kind of Infinite can, on the other hand, be divided into parts
without contradiction. They would also have understood what kind of Infinite can be
conceived to be greater than another Infinite, without any contradiction, and what kind cannot
be so conceived (Let. XII). 
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The presentation of these distinctions as contradictions depends only on the
presentation of a problem whose terms have been inadequately distinguished
and thus inadequately posed.
Rather than presenting the bad infinite and the actual infinite as
contradictory, the latter being the result of the negation of the former,
Macherey argues that the bad infinite, or what he refers to as the unlimited or
indefinite, and the actual infinite, are one and the same thing as perceived
respectively from the point of view of the imagination and from that of reason. 
Macherey argues that the adequate understanding of a thing, which grasps
the thing according to or after its cause, must be understood “affirmatively, in
the sense of the absolute affirmation of the nature of the thing” (172). It is an
understanding which is thus not determined negatively by the negation of the
bad infinite, as it is according to the Hegelian dialectical logic, but positively
from the point of view of the immanent cause of a thing, which is substance
in the form of its attributes. The actual infinite “expresses directly the
immanent, and non-transitive, relation which ties substance and its affections,
and which is known only by the understanding” (172). The bad infinite or
unlimited is the inadequate idea of the way in which the actual infinite is
expressed in a finite mode. According to Macherey, the actual infinite, as
apprehended adequately in the modes, “is not different to that infinity
constitutive of substance, but is formally the same”(173). The actual infinite is
therefore the immanent expression in the affections, or the finite modes, of
infinite substance, which is their cause.
The Adequate and the Inadequate Idea of the Actual Infinite.
In the text of the example of Letter XII, the introductory sentence which
Macherey translates similarly to Hegel as “All the inequalities of the space
interposed between two circles [toutes les inégalités de l’espace interposé entre
deux cercles]” (164), the reference to “the space interposed” between the two
non-concentric circles actually “designates the set of distances” (164), that is,
all of the different distances, which separate the two circumferences, including
the two extreme distances, represented by the segments AB and CD. The
“inequalities of the space” should then be understood to refer to “the set of the
differences between these unequal distances”, or, what Macherey emphasises
as “the variation” of these “differences”, which is determined by the rotation of
the segments from AB towards CD, “in the sense of the hands of a watch”
(165). This set, which is “the sum of the inequalities of distance included in this
… total space” (165), is a continuous and therefore infinite variation.
Rather than being limited, because included between a maximum (the
circumference of circle A) and a minimum (that of circle B) and therefore
being finite, as Hegel seems to indicate, the “inequalities of the space”, or the
differences between the unequal distances, and the “variation” of these
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differences, are only limited by the difference between the maximum distance,
AB, and the minimum distance, CD. 
It is this idea of the variation of differences which depends on the fact that
the two circles are non-concentric, which is neglected by Hegel in his account
of the geometrical example. For Macherey, the actual infinite is expressed in
the example by the infinite variation of differences. The infinite variation can
be understood as actually infinite from the point of view of reason, insofar as
it has its cause in substance, and as indefinite or unlimited from the point of
view of the imagination, insofar as it is represented as the sum of the
multiplicity of its parts, since it is only from the point of view of the
imagination that number can be applied to it.
According to Macherey, and contrary to Hegel, Spinoza’s example does not
function to represent the mediation between the different infinities that it
represents, but rather it represents both infinities as existing simultaneously,
their difference not being a matter of one’s negation of the other, as embodied
in an opposition or contradiction, but rather a matter of a difference in the
degree of understanding, that is, an epistemological difference, which can vary
from an inadequate idea of the way in which the actual infinite is expressed in
the finite (as unlimited or indefinite), to the adequate understanding of the
expression of the actual infinite in the finite, as the substantial cause of the
finite, insofar as substance is the immanent cause of all finite things. The idea
of infinite variation in the geometric example is therefore conceived by
Macherey as inadequate when the infinite variation of differences is
represented by the imagination as unlimited or indefinite, and as adequate
when the infinite variation of differences is understood adequately as the
actual infinite expressed in the finite, that is, infinite substance as expressed in
its finite modes. Macherey can therefore conclude that “it seems … the error
of the imagination consists in taking as infinite, in the attempt to determine it
numerically, a thing which is … finite” (170).
The adequate expression of the actual infinite in the finite is, according to
Macherey, the adequate knowledge of its immanent cause in substance. When
the distinctions between the different infinities introduced by Spinoza in the
discussion of “the problem of the Infinite” of Letter XII, are respected,
Macherey argues that the contradictions involved in the relation of the finite to
the infinite are not resolved, as Hegel considers them to have been by means
of the dialectical logic of the negation of the negation, but, rather, they are
effaced. The relation between the finite and the infinite is no longer one of
contradiction. As Gueroult argues, “the solution to the problem of the infinite,
due to [an adequate] idea of substance, puts an end to all antinomies” (209). 
The adequate idea of the actual infinite, as the positive immanent
expression of the absolutely infinite in the finite, is the adequate understanding
of its implication in this relation. The inadequate idea of the actual infinite, as
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unlimited or indefinite, is not in a relation of negation to this positive
expression of the infinite, but is rather only an imaginary representation of the
actual infinite, and, as such, it betrays only a partial degree of understanding.
The Letter on the Infinite
Having utilised the geometrical example of Spinoza’s Letter XII to
distinguish the respective interpretations of Spinoza by Hegel and Macherey,
Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza will be distinguished from that of Hegel and
Macherey insofar as it too offers an alternative reading of what Deleuze
describes as the “very bizarre, curious”11 geometrical example. By implicating
Leibniz’s understanding of the early form of the infinitesimal calculus in his
reading of the geometrical example, Deleuze argues that it is able to be
characterised as an example of what had already been established of the
infinitesimal calculus. He thereby traces an alternative lineage between Leibniz
and Spinoza to that determined by Hegel in the development of the dialectical
logic. It is by means of Deleuze’s reading of Letter XII that the investigation
into the logic that is mobilised in his reading of Spinoza in Expressionism in
Philosophy, as an alternative to the dialectical logic, is developed in The Logic
of Expression: Quality, Quantity andIintensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze,12
and it is Gueroult’s reading of Letter XII which provides the point of departure
for this investigation. However, it is the explication of this point of departure
that remains the focus of the present paper.
In “Spinoza’s Letter on the Infinite”, Gueroult suggests that the meaning of
the geometrical example is “generally wrongly understood”, and that it has
been “vitiated in its principle through errors in translation” (206). Macherey
continues this argument in Hegel ou Spinoza when he writes that “the example
as reproduced by Hegel is not the same as that given in the text of Spinoza”.
He argues that the same example is exploited by each commentator “in
markedly different ways” (168). Macherey and Gueroult come to very similar
conclusions in relation to their respective interpretations of Letter XII and of
Hegel’s misreading of it. However, Macherey criticises Gueroult’s fourfold
distinction of the definitions of infinity in Letter XII: “In his commentary on
the letter on infinity, Gueroult enumerates four successive cases which, in
relation to the text of Spinoza, seems excessive” (169). Gueroult breaks the
distinctions down as follows:
1. The thing infinite by its essence or by virtue of its definition. 
2. The thing without limits, not by virtue of its essence, but by virtue of its
cause.
3. The thing infinite insofar as without limits. 
4. The thing infinite insofar as its parts, although included within a maximum
and minimum known to us, cannot be expressed by any number. (183)
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Macherey considers the third definition to be superfluous since when
understood from the point of view of reason, it is the same as the second
definition, and when the second definition is represented inadequately from the
point of view of the imagination, the result is the third definition. The
significance of this move is that the fourth definition, which is illustrated by the
geometrical example, then becomes the example of the implied difference in
the second definition, between an imaginary and a rational understanding of the
infinite. For Gueroult, however, the significance of the third definition rests, on
the one hand, on its distinction from the fourth definition and, on the other
hand, on its importance as to his criticism of the Hegelian interpretation of
Letter XII. Presenting his case, Gueroult argues that the geometrical example,
which illustrates the fourth definition, “is advanced in order to refute the false
interpretation” that “every infinite is such that its magnitude is so excessive …
that we cannot perceive its limits, or that its variations are not contained
between any boundaries” (202). This explanation merely repeats the third
definition. To claim that the infinite must everywhere be said to be inferred
from the multitude of its parts is to explain the infinite by the finite, which can
only then “be avoided by the negation of the Infinite on behalf of the finite”
(192). Gueroult is critical of Hegel’s reading of Letter XII insofar as it relies on
the third definition in order to secure the mediation of the dialectical relation
between the finite and the infinite. Macherey’s recognition of this is the reason
that he considers the third definition superfluous to an adequate understanding
of Spinoza’s infinite. Gueroult argues that, contrary to Hegel’s interpretation,
the third and fourth definitions present two different definitions of the infinite
which do not implicate each other in a dialectical relation of negation. What
Hegel presents as a dialectical relation of opposition between a mathematical
and a philosophic infinite, Gueroult presents as a difference between a mathe-
matical infinite, that is, an arithmetic or algebraic infinite, as defined by the
third definition,13 and a geometric infinite, as illustrated by the fourth
definition.14 Hegel’s reliance on the third definition renders the geometric
infinite, as characterised by Spinoza in the geometrical example, superfluous to
his interpretation of Letter XII. Hegel implicates the mathematical infinite
solely as an algebraic infinite. Spinoza’s depreciation of arithmetic, which,
along with number, is reduced to a finite being of the imagination,15 is set
against what Gueroult describes as Spinoza’s “correlative exaltation of
geometrical thought” (206). What Hegel recognises as Spinoza’s rejection of
the mathematical infinite is rather a rejection of the algebraic infinite in the
name of a geometric infinite. Spinoza’s geometric infinite is therefore different
to Hegel’s mathematical algebraic infinite. Gueroult suggests that “this …
establishes a vigorous contrast between the mathematical philosophy of
Spinoza and those of the philosophers of his time” (201), a contrast which
could well be extended to include the interpretations of both Macherey and
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Hegel. Spinoza here sets geometry against algebra, a properly geometric
infinite against an algebraic infinite. Gueroult suggests that this “opens an abyss
between arithmetic and geometry” (201), which he then maps onto the
epistemological difference as the difference between an adequate
understanding of the geometric infinite as actually infinite from the point of
view of reason, and an inadequate representation of this geometric infinite as
an algebraic infinite from the point of view of the imagination.
The Geometric Infinite as “an Infinite Sum of Differentials”.
Deleuze’s interpretation of Letter XII in Expressionism in Philosophy takes up
this distinction between algebra and geometry in order to redeploy the definitions
of the infinite from the point of view of the geometrical example. Deleuze elicits
the support of Leibniz to argue that Spinoza’s exposition of the geometric infinite
in Letter XII goes “further on this point than many mathematicians” (EPS 203).
According to Deleuze, the properly geometric infinite characterised in the fourth
definition, as distinct from the algebraic infinite of the third definition, defines “a
strictly extensive infinity”, which is a properly “modal and quantitative” infinite
(EPS 202). A thorough analysis of Deleuze’s interpretation of Letter XII is
required to illustrate how he comes to this conclusion.
Deleuze distinguishes his interpretation of Letter XII from that of Hegel by
arguing that “two concentric circles of which one is interior to the other lack
the greatest and smallest distance of one circle to the other”.16 In order to
explicate what happens across this maximum and minimum orthogonal
distance, Deleuze offers a translation of the sentence with which Spinoza
introduces the example. Spinoza writes: “omnes inæqualitates spatii duobus
circulis AB, & CD, interpositi”.17 Deleuze translates this as “the sum of the
inequalities of distance included between two circles, AB and CD”.18 Deleuze
considers this example to define “a very particular geometric infinite”.19 Hegel
considers only the algebraic infinity of unequal distances, that is, if all the lines
or segments that go from one circle to the other, the orthogonal distances, are
placed end to end, the sum would be infinite. This sum 
would be equally infinite if the two circles were concentric and if all the segments … were
equal, it is [therefore] clear that [for Hegel] the infinite sum of the unequal segments … is not
related to their inequality and is not delimited by the maximum and the minimum of their
variations”(Gueroult, 207). 
Deleuze, on the contrary, considers it to be a question, not of the sum of the
segments, or orthogonal distances, but rather of the sum of their inequalities,
that is, the sum of the differences between the orthogonal distances. 
Macherey also distinguishes his reading of Letter XII from that of Hegel in
this way, however, he does not conceive of the infinite variation of differences,
understood adequately from the point of view of reason, to be a geometric
infinite. Macherey reserves the use of the term “sum” for references associated
296
with the inadequate representation of this infinite from the point of view of the
imagination. An infinite sum which is only inadequately supposed to be
infinite, or unlimited, by the multitude of its parts, is an algebraic infinite.
Deleuze considers the adequate understanding of the infinite from the point of
view of reason to be an infinite sum which is distinctly geometrical. He argues
that the geometric infinite “is not strictly speaking ‘unlimited’: for it relates to
… the … maximum (AB) and … minimum (CD) distance between two non-
concentric circles, and these distances attach to a perfectly limited and
determinate space” (EPS 202). When the orthogonal distances vary
continuously from AB to CD, the sum of the successive differences is not
simply a matter of “an infinite sum of finite quantities”, as Hegel contends, nor
is it “the infinite variation of differences” as Macherey contends, but, Gueroult
argues, and Deleuze backs up this argument, it should rather be understood as
“an infinite sum of differentials” (207).
The concept of the differential was introduced by developments in the
infinitesimal calculus during the later part of the seventeenth century. Deleuze
positions Spinoza’s geometric infinite within the early stages of this
development, which Carl Boyer, in The History of the Calculus and its
Conceptual Development, describes as being “bound up with concepts of
geometry … and with explanations of … the infinitely small”.20 Boyer
describes the infinitesimal calculus as dealing with “the infinite sequences …
obtained by continuing … to diminish ad infinitum the intervals between the
values of the independent variable. … By means of [these] successive
subdivisions … the smallest possible intervals or differentials” are obtained
(ibid., p. 12). The differential can therefore be understood to be the
infinitesimal difference between consecutive values of a continuously
diminishing quantity. Boyer refers to this early form of the infinitesimal
calculus as the infinitesimal calculus from “the differential point of view” (12).
Gueroult provides a succinct definition of the differential in relation to the
geometrical example of Letter XII when he suggests that the determinate
distance ‘AB minus CD’ “includes an actual infinity of infinitely small
distances, and consequently is indivisible into discontinuous parts” (Gueroult
209). Each of these infinitely small distances corresponds to a differential.
Boyer argues that, “the derivative would in this case be defined as the quotient
of two such differentials, and the integral would then be the sum of a number
(perhaps finite, perhaps infinite) of such differentials” (Boyer, 12). The
geometric infinite of Spinoza’s Letter XII, as “an infinite sum of differentials”,
can therefore be understood to be an example of an integral from the
differential point of view. 
Gueroult identifies the integral in the geometrical example as a definite
integral when he argues that “the distance CD is a minimal quantity obtained
by continuously diminishing the infinitely small parts of AB, the sum of these
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diminishments being a definite integral, that is, a finite quantity … resulting
from an infinite summation of differentials” (209). According to Gueroult, the
infinite sum of the differentials is a definite integral, and a definite integral is
a finite quantity. In this way, the geometrical example illustrates the
implication and envelopment of the infinite in the finite.
What Deleuze then does with the concept of the infinitesimal calculus from
the differential point of view distinguishes his interpretation of Letter XII from
that of Gueroult. Whereas Gueroult only suggests the implication of the
infinitesimal calculus in his interpretation of Spinoza’s Letter XII, Deleuze
explores this implication in his interpretation of Spinoza’s work as a whole. It
is here that we begin to approach not only the originality of Deleuze’s
interpretation of Spinoza, but also one of the points where Deleuze departs
from Spinozism by tracing an alternative lineage in the history of philosophy
in relation to Leibniz.
The Differential Point of View
The infinitesimal calculus consists of two branches which are inverse
operations: differential calculus, which is concerned with calculating
derivatives, or differential relations; and integral calculus, which is concerned
with integration, or the calculation of the infinite sum of the differentials. The
derivative, from the differential point of view of the infinitesimal calculus, is the
quotient of two differentials, that is, a differential relation, of the type dy/dx. The
differential, dy, is an infinitely small quantity, or what Deleuze describes as “a
vanishing quantity”21; a quantity smaller than any given or givable quantity.
Therefore, as a vanishing quantity, dy, in relation to y, is, strictly speaking, equal
to zero; as is dx, in relation to x. Given that y is a quantity of the abscissa, and
that x is a quantity of the ordinate, dy = 0 in relation to the abscissa, and dx = 0
in relation to the ordinate. The differential relation can therefore be written as
dy/dx = 0/0. However, despite the fact that dy/dx = 0/0, and that 0/0 = 0, the
relation between these two differentials, dy/dx, does not equal zero, dy/dx ↑ 0.
This is because the differentials do actually exist as vanishing quantities, that is,
despite the fact that, strictly speaking, they equal zero, they are still not yet, or
not quite equal to, zero. “What subsists when dy and dx cancel out under the
form of vanishing quantities is the relation dy/dx itself” (17.2.81). It is here that
Deleuze considers seventeenth century logic to have made “a fundamental leap”,
by determining “a logic of relations” (10.3.81). He argues that “under this form
of infinitesimal calculus is discovered a domain where the relations no longer
depend on their terms”. According to Deleuze, “the terms between which the
relation establishes itself are neither determined, nor determinable. Only the
relation between its terms is determined” (10.3.81). This is the logic of relations
that Deleuze locates in the infinitesimal calculus of the seventeenth century,
which he then mobilises in his reading of Spinoza’s Letter XII, and in his
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reading of Spinoza’s work as a whole, particularly in relation to the physics of
bodies in the second part of the Ethics (P13).
The differential relation, which Deleuze characterises as a “pure relation”,
because it is independent of its terms, and which subsists insofar as dy/dx ↑ 0,
has a perfectly expressible finite quantity designated by a third term, z, such
that dy/dx equals z. Deleuze argues that “when you have a [differential] relation
derived from a circle, this relation doesn’t involve the circle at all but refers
[rather] to what is called a tangent” (17.2.81). A tangent is a line that touches a
circle or curve at one point. The gradient of a tangent indicates the rate of
change of the curve at that point, that is, the rate at which the curve changes on
the y-axis relative to the x-axis. The differential relation therefore serves in the
determination of this third term, z, the value of which is the gradient of the
tangent to the circle or curve. In the case of the geometrical example, it is the
tangents to the circumferences of the two circles at A and C which define the
maximum and minimum limits of the orthogonal distances AB and CD. 
When referring to the geometrical study of curves in his early mathematical
manuscripts, Leibniz writes that “the differential calculus could be employed
with diagrams in an even more wonderfully simple manner than it was with
numbers”.22 Leibniz presents one such diagram in a paper entitled
“Justification of the Infinitesimal Calculus by That of Ordinary Algebra”,23
when he offers an example of what had already been established of the
infinitesimal calculus in relation to particular problems before the greater
generality of its methods were developed. An outline of the example that
Leibniz gives is as follows:
Figure 2
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Since the two right triangles, ZFE and ZHJ, that meet at their apex, point Z,
are similar, it follows that the ratio y/x is equal to (Y – y)/X. As the straight line
EJ approaches point F, maintaining the same angle at the variable point Z, the
lengths of the straight lines FZ and FE, or y and x, steadily diminish, yet the
ratio of y to x remains constant. When the straight line EJ passes through F, the
points E and Z coincide with F, and the straight lines, y and x, vanish. Yet y and
x will not be absolutely nothing since they preserve the ratio of ZH to HJ,
represented by the proportion (Y – y)/X, which in this case reduces to Y/X, and
obviously does not equal zero. The relation y/x continues to exist even though
the terms have vanished, since the relation is determinable as equal to Y/X. In
this algebraic calculus, the vanished lines x and y are not taken for zeros since
they still have an algebraic relation to each other. “And so”, Leibniz argues,
“they are treated as infinitesimals, exactly as one of the elements which …
differential calculus recognises in the ordinates of curves for momentary
increments and decrements”(545). That is, the vanished lines x and y are
determinable in relation to each other only insofar as they can be replaced by
the infinitesimals dy and dx, by making the supposition that the ratio y/x is
equal to the ratio of the infinitesimals, dy/dx. In the first published account of
the calculus, Leibniz defines the ratio of infinitesimals as the quotient of first-
order differentials, or the differential relation. He says that “the differential dx
of the abscissa x is an arbitrary quantity, and that the differential dy of the
ordinate y is defined as the quantity which is to dx as the ratio of the ordinate
to the subtangent” (Boyer, 210). Leibniz considers differentials to be the
fundamental concepts of the infinitesimal calculus, the differential relation
being defined in terms of these differentials.
Deleuze considers Spinoza’s Letter XII to provide an example of what had
already been established of the infinitesimal calculus in relation to a particular
problem at the level of geometry; the geometric infinite. Spinoza’s example is
schematic in just the right proportion to be representable using this Leibnizian
formulation of the early form of the infinitesimal calculus. The example of two
non-concentric circles (Figure 1) can be transposed onto Leibniz’s example
(Figure 2) by letting Z be the point on the maximum orthogonal distance AB
(Figure 3), such that AZ equals AB minus CD. The points A and Z represent
the points of tangency of the minimum and maximum orthogonal distances
respectively on AB. Since the values of the differences of distance of
Spinoza’s example vary between A and Z, then, according to Leibniz’s
justification of the infinitesimal calculus by algebra, each of these differences
of distance can be represented by an algebraic ratio of infinitesimals, that is,
by a differential relation, dy/dx, the infinite sum of these differential relations
being the infinite sum that Spinoza refers to in Letter XII. The geometric
infinite, as “an infinite sum of differentials”, can therefore be understood to be
an example of an integral from the differential point of view of the
300
infinitesimal calculus. Insofar as this infinite sum is understood to function as
such an integral, it provides an example of what Deleuze describes as the
“integral calculus performed unknowingly” (1994, 174).
The differential point of view of the infinitesimal calculus approaches
integration as a process of summation by considering the problem of finding
the area under the graph of a function. This problem is dealt with by dividing
up the area under the curve into a large number of rectangles. The area under
the curve is the sum of the infinitely small and infinitely numerous rectangles.
The difference between this sum and the actual area is considered small
enough to be neglected. The integral is therefore the finite magnitude of the
area.
A New Theory of Relations
Leibniz recognised integration to be a process not only of summation, but
also of the inverse transformation of differentiation, so the integral is not only
the sum of differentials, but also the inverse of the differential relation. In the
early nineteenth century, the process of integration as a summation was
overlooked by most mathematicians in favour of determining integration,
instead, as the inverse transformation of differentiation. Hegel continued this
tendency by defining the integral solely as the inverse of the differential
relation. According to Hegel, “the integral calculus has been simplified and
more correctly determined merely by the fact that it is no longer taken to be a
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Figure 3
method of summation in which it appeared essentially connected with the form
of a series” (SL 294). The main reason for this was that by extending sums to
an infinite number of terms, problems began to emerge if the series did not
converge. The value or sum of an infinite series is only determinable if the
series converges. Divergent series have no sum. It was considered that
reckoning with divergent series would therefore lead to false results. However,
the problem of integration as a process of summation from the differential
point of view of the infinitesimal calculus did continue to be explored. It was
Augustin Cauchy (1789–1857) who first introduced specific tests for the
convergence of series, so that divergent series could henceforth be excluded
from being used to try to solve problems of integration, because of their
propensity to lead to false results.24 This method was later reformulated by
Cauchy as the determination of the definite integral, which is distinguished
from the indefinite integral only insofar as the definite integral is used to
determine the limit of the sum of the area under the curve between two points
on the x-axis, whereas the indefinite integral, as the primitive function whose
derivative is the given function, determines the whole curve. Both integrals,
definite and indefinite, are determinable by the inverse transformation of the
differential relation; the definite integral being determined within a limited
interval. Whereas Gueroult equates the infinite sum of Spinoza’s example with
this definite integral, Deleuze rather appeals to the “barbaric or pre-scientific
interpretations of the differential calculus”,25 as presented by the differential
point of view of the infinitesimal calculus, according to which integration is a
method of summation in the form of a series. 
The object of the process of integration in general is to determine from the
coefficients of the given function of the differential relation the original
function from which they were derived. Put simply, given a relation between
two differentials, dy/dx, the problem of integration is how to find a relation
between the quantities themselves, y and x. This problem corresponds to the
geometrical method of finding the function of a curve characterised by a given
property of its tangent. The differential relation is thought of as another
function which describes, at each point on an original function, the gradient of
the line tangent to the curve at that point. The value of this “gradient” indicates
a specific quality of the original function; its rate of change at that point. The
differential relation therefore indicates the specific qualitative nature of the
original function at the different points of the curve. 
The inverse process of this method is differentiation, which, in geometrical
terms, determines the differential relation as the function of the line tangent to
a given curve. Put simply, to determine the tangent of a curve at a specified
point, a second point that satisfies the function of the curve is selected, and the
gradient of the line that runs through both of these points is calculated. As the
second point approaches the point of tangency, the gradient of the line between
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the two points approaches the gradient of the tangent. The gradient of the
tangent is, therefore, the limit of the gradient of the line between the two
points.
It was Newton who first came up with this concept of a limit. He
conceptualized the tangent geometrically, as the limit of a sequence of lines
between two points on a curve, which he called a secant. As the distance
between the points approached zero, the secants became progressively smaller,
however they always retained “a real length”. The secant therefore approached
the tangent without reaching it. When this distance “got arbitrarily small (but
remained a real number)”,26 it was considered insignificant for practical
purpose, and was ignored. What is different in Leibniz’s method is that he
“hypothesized infinitely small numbers — infinitesimals — to designate the
size of infinitely small intervals” (ibid). For Newton, on the contrary, these
intervals remained only small, and therefore real. When performing
calculations, however, both approaches yielded the same results. But they
differed ontologically, because Leibniz had hypothesized a new kind of
number, a number Newton did not need since “his secants always had a real
length, while Leibniz’s had an infinitesimal length” (ibid).
For the next two hundred years, various attempts were made to find a
rigorous arithmetic foundation for the calculus; one that did not rely on either
the mathematical intuition of geometry, with its tangents and secants, which
was perceived as imprecise, because its conception of limits was not properly
understood, or on the vagaries of the infinitesimal, which made many
mathematicians wary, so much so that they refused the hypothesis outright,
despite the fact that Leibniz “could do calculus using arithmetic without
geometry — by using infinitesimal numbers”(ibid). It was not until the late
nineteenth century, that an adequate solution to this problem of rigor was
posed. It was Karl Weierstrass (1815–1897) who “developed a pure
nongeometric arithmetization for Newtonian calculus” (ibid 230), which
provided the rigor that had been lacking. “Weierstrass’s theory was an updated
version of Cauchy’s earlier account” (ibid 309), which had also had problems
conceptualising limits. Cauchy actually begs the question of the concept of
limit in his proof.27 In order to overcome this problem of conceptualising
limits, Weierstrass “sought to eliminate all geometry from the study of …
derivatives and integrals in calculus”.28 In order to characterize calculus purely
in terms of arithmetic, it was necessary for the idea of a function, as a curve in
the Cartesian plane defined in terms of the motion of a point, to be completely
replaced with the idea of a function that is, rather, a set of ordered pairs of real
numbers. The geometric idea of ‘approaching a limit’ had to be replaced by an
arithmetized concept of limit that relied on static logical constraints on
numbers alone. This approach is commonly referred to as the epsilon-delta
method. Deleuze argues that “it is Weierstrass who bypasses all the
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interpretations of the differential calculus from Leibniz to Lagrange, by saying
that it has nothing to do with a process. … Weierstrass gives an interpretation
of the differential and infinitesimal calculus which he himself calls static,
where there is no longer fluctuation towards a limit, nor any idea of threshold”
(22.2.72). The calculus was thereby reformulated without either geometric
secants and tangents or infinitesimals; only the real numbers were used. 
Because there is no reference to infinitesimals in this Weierstrassian
definition of the calculus, the designation ‘the infinitesimal calculus’ was
considered to be “inapproporiate”.29 Weierstrass’s work not only effectively
removed any remnants of geometry from what was now referred to as the
differential calculus, but it eliminated the use of Leibnizian-inspired
infinitesimal arithmetic in doing the calculus for over half a century. It was not
until the late 1960’s, with the development of the controversial axioms of non-
standard analysis by Abraham Robinson (1918–1974), that the infinitesimal
calculus was given a rigorous foundation, and a formal theory of the
infinitesimal calculus was constructed, thus allowing Leibniz’ ideas to be
“fully vindicated”,30 as Newton’s had been thanks to Weierstrass. It is
specifically in relation to these developments that Deleuze’s appeal to the
“barbaric or pre-scientific interpretations of the differential calculus”, should
be understood.
Although it is only later in the development of the infinitesimal calculus
that the tangent comes to be considered as a limit, and that the differential
relation is used to calculate ‘limits,’ Deleuze contends that the maximum and
minimum illustrated in Spinoza’s geometrical example are suggestive of such
limits. He introduces the concepts of the differential relation and limits into his
interpretation not only of Letter XII, but also into his interpretation of the
physics of bodies presented in the second part of the Ethics. So, according to
Deleuze, the value of z, which was determined by Leibniz in relation to the
differential relation (dy/dx) as the gradient of the tangent, functions as a limit.
When the relation establishes itself between infinitely small terms, it does not
cancel itself out with its terms, but rather tends towards a limit, z. Since the
differential relation approaches closer to its limit as the differentials decrease
in size, or approach zero, the limit of the relation is represented by the relation
between the infinitely small. Of course, despite the geometrical nature of the
idea of a variable and a limit, the former ‘decrease in size’ or ‘approach zero’,
and the differential relation ‘approaches’ or ‘tends towards’ the latter, they are
not essentially dynamic, but involve purely static considerations, that is, they
are rather “to be taken automatically as a kind of shorthand for the
corresponding developments of the epsilon-delta approach” (ibid 277). It is in
this sense that the differential relation between the infinitely small refers to
something finite. Or, as Deleuze suggests, it is in the finite itself that there is
the “mutual immanence” (17.2.81) of the relation and the infinitely small. 
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Given that the method of integration provides a way of working back from
the differential relation, the problem of integration is, therefore, how to reverse
this process of differentiation. This can be solved by determining the inverse
of the given differential relation according to the inverse transformation of
differentiation, as Hegel had favoured. Or, a solution can be determined from
the differential point of view of the infinitesimal calculus by considering
integration as a process of summation in the form of a series, according to
which, given the specific qualitative nature of a tangent at a point, the problem
becomes that of finding, not just one other point determinative of the
differential relation, but a sequence of points, all of which together satisfy, or
generate, a curve and therefore a function in the neighbourhood of the given
point of tangency, which therefore functions as the limit of the function.
Deleuze considers this to be the base of the infinitesimal calculus as
understood or interpreted in the seventeenth century. The formula for the
problem of the infinite that Deleuze extracts from the geometrical example of
Letter XII, by means of this seventeenth-century understanding of the
infinitesimal calculus, is that “something finite consists of an infinity under a
certain relation”. Deleuze considers this formula to mark “an equilibrium
point, for seventeenth-century thought, between the infinite and the finite, by
means of a new theory of relations” (17.2.81).
By implicating Leibniz’s understanding of the early form of the
infinitesimal calculus in his interpretation of the geometrical example of
Spinoza’s Letter XII, Deleuze not only demonstrates how Spinoza eludes the
grasp of the dialectical progression of the history of philosophy, but also
nominates Leibniz as one of the figures with whom he engages in his project
of renewing the history of philosophy by constructing an alternative lineage in
the history of philosophy. Deleuze reads Spinoza’s geometrical example as
providing an example of what had already been established by the
infinitesimal calculus in response to the problem of the infinite. He considers
seventeenth century thought, and this includes Spinoza, to have developed a
new theory of relations by means of the infinitesimal calculus, one which is
determined according to the differential point of view of the infinitesimal
calculus. The infinitesimal calculus puts into play a certain type of relation for
Deleuze — the differential relation — which is characteristic of the
compositional relations between individuals. It is by exploiting the
implications of the differential point of view of the infinitesimal calculus in his
interpretation of the physics of bodies in the second part of the Ethics, that
Deleuze determines the logic that is mobilised in his reading of the system of
the Ethics as a whole. This strategy of reading the Ethics marks not only the
originality of Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza, but also one of the points
where Deleuze can be considered to depart from the Cartesian and Hegelian
Spinoza familiar to scholars working in the field of Spinoza studies by tracing
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an alternative lineage in the history of philosophy between Spinoza’s ontology
and the mathematics of Leibniz.
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